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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
THE DOCTRINE OF THE "NORMAL MAX."
This doctrine occurs in one shape or other in many con-
nections, but as it is most prominent in the law relating to
cases of negligence, it is there that we shall look first for a
description of it. The "normal man" is sometimes known
as the "reasonable man" or the "reasonably prudent man"
or the "man of ordinary sense." But under these various
titles there is one outstanding, easily recognized feature; and
that is, that he does not have his counterpart in particular,
everyday life. He is rather a type with whom everybody
may be compared, and it is for this reason he has been
described as the "normal man."
Probably the best definition that can be obtained of this
"reasonably prudent man"I is picked up piecemeal from Pol-
lock on Torts.1 "The doctrine of 'natural and probable
consequences' is most clearly illustrated, however, in the law
of negligence. For there the substance of the wrong is
failure to act with due foresight: it has been defined as 'the
omission to do something which a reasonably prudent man,
guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which
a reasonable and prudent man would not do.' Now a reason-
able man can be guided only by a reasonable estimate of
probabilities. If men went about to guard themselves against
every risk to themselves or others which might by ingenious
conjecture be conceived as possible, human affairs could not
be carried on at all. The reasonable man to whose ideal be-
havior we are to look as the standard of duty, will neither
neglect what he can forecast as probable, nor waste his anxiety
on events that are barely possible. He will order his pre-
caution by what appears likely in the known course of things.
1. Pollock on Torts, pp. 39-40.
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This being the standard, it follows that if in a particular case
(not being within certain special and more stringent rules),
the harm complained of is not such as a reasonable man in the
defendant's place should have foreseen as likely to happen,
there is no wrong and no liability, and the statement pro-
posed, though not positively laid down, 'that a person is
not expected to anticipate and guard against that which no
reasonable man would expect to occur,' appears to contain
the only rule tenable on principle where the liability is founded
solely on negligence. And again when defining negligence,
the general rule was thus stated by Baron Alderson: 'Negli-
gence is the omission to do something which a reasonably
prudent man, guided upon those considerations which ordi-
narily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or
doing something which a reasonable and prudent man would
not do.' This, it will be observed, says nothing of the party's
state of mind, and rightly. The question for judges and
juries is not what a man was thinking or not thinking about,
expecting or not expecting, but whether his behavior was
or was not such as we demand of a prudent man under the
given circumstances. Facts which were known to him or by
the exercise of appropriate diligence would have been known
to a prudent man in his place, come into account as part of
the circumstances. Even as to these, the point for actual
knowledge is a subordinate one as regards the theoretical
foundation of liability. The question is not so much what
a man of whom diligence was required actually thought of
or perceived, as what would have been perceived by a man
of ordinary senses who did think."
The question was squarely put to the court in Vaughan
v. Menlove.2 This was a suit based on the destruction of a
hayrick by fire. The jury had been directed "that the ques-
tion for them to consider was whether the fire had been occa-
sioned by gross negligence on the part of the defendant,"
2. 3 Bing. N. C. 468.
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and that "he was bound to proceed with such reasonable cau-
tion as a prudent man would have exercised under such cir-
c.umstances." A rule for a new trial was obtained on the
ground that "the jury should have been directed to consider,
not whether the defendant had been guilty of gross negli-
gence With reference to the standard of ordinary prudence, a
standard too uncertain to afford any criterion, but whether
he had acted bona fide to the best of his judgment; if he
had, he ouglht not to be responsible for not possessing the
highest order of intelligence." In dismissing the rule, the
court unanimously declined to accede to this view, and said:
"We have assumed that the standard of duty is not the fore-
sight and caution which this or that particular man is capable
of, but the foresight and caution of a prudent man,-the aver-
age prudent man, or as our text-books affect to say, a reason-
able man,-standing in this or that man's shoes." It has
always been so laid down and the alleged uncertainty of the
rule has been found no obstacle to its application by juries.
It is not for the court to define a reasonably prudent man, but
for the jury to say whether he acted like one.
In favor of this view of the doctrine, it is claimed that
it can be generally or universally applied, whereas the test
of the man's actual capacity displayed in each case must
continually vary; that it is sufficiently well understood that a
court need not define it, but juries can apply it without any
instructions and in fact have always done so, and that the
court may assume that every man has a capacity to judge
events equal to that of the man of ordinary prudence.
At first blush, this text-book theory appears to be a
panacea for legal ills of a negligent character. But imme-
diately a doubt arises when one attempts to see how it actu-
ally works. The first question that one may ask is whether
as a matter of fact it is ever put into actual application. The
"normal man" regarded as an idea can hardly be that of a
concrete individual, for, if it were so, it could not boast of
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general applicability, and further, it is expressly stated that
the law deliberately leaves the personal characteristics or
idiosyncracies of the individual out of account. This idea of
the "normal man" must then, it seems, be taken to be a gen-
eral or abstract one. The question remains as to how it can
be applied to individual instances.
Most psychologists have a theory of general ideas, 3 but
they do not all agree as to what they are or as to how they
are formed. There is not, however, any real dispute as to
the fact that they arise through a comparison of individual
instances, by which the common or like characteristics are
retained, and the unlike ones either merely disregarded, as
Bain said, or definitely recognized as irrelevant, as Prof.
Stout insists. It is because of this dropping of particular
details that the charge of vagueness has been brought against
generic images by Prof. Huxley,4 who compared them to what
one sees in dreams. If they are really of this vague char-
acter, it is not surprising that the "normal man" has been
tagged as a "standard too uncertain to afford any criterion."
It was maintained by Berkley 5 that if we tried to picture
to ourselves an abstract idea such as "man," "humanity,"
etc., we did as a matter of fact always call up the image of
an individual with some particular shape and color. It seems
now to be generally admitted that it is impossible to image
a general idea. For example, Hoffding says, "that general
outline or pattern which we think of as filled up in different
ways, can not in itself be pictured. It shares the fate of all
general ideas and requires an individual representation," and
speaks of the name as a substitute for the impossible in-
tuition.
My belief is that consciously or unconsciously, the judge
or the juryman does, in each case, when he attempts to apply
3. Bain, Mental and Moral Science, p. 177; Stout, Analytical Psy-
chology, Vol. I, p. 176.
4. Huxley's Hume, pp. 92-94.
5. Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, Intro. Secs. 10, 14.
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his test, have in mind a concrete individual who is no less
a person than his own self. This is his mental image, and
the question which he really asks himself is, "Does the defend-
ant appear to me to hav e exercised prudence or not? Should
I have done the same if I had been in his place?" And he
answers this to himself, without any reference to any gen-
eral standard or general rule at all, but merely according to
his own individual experience and the idiosyncracies of his
own particular disposition. Hence it results that so far, from
the test of "the man of average prudence" being a general
one, it varies with each individual who applies it, and the
Learned Chief Justice in the case of Vaughan v. Menlove,0
quoted above, accurately described his own test when using
the phrase "as variable as the foot of each individual."
In other words the standard of the "normal man" is
simply neglected altogether and another standard is substi-
tuted for it, and this is the real explanation of why "the
alleged uncertainty of the rule has been found no obstacle
to its application by juries," and why it had been found
unnecessary, too, for the court to define a prudent man. It
could not have defined one had it tried.
In the case of Vaughan v. Menlove, supra, if the defend-
ant fell below the "normal man" then it is evident that a
higher standard was being demanded of him than it was pos-
sible for him to attain to. All men are not alike, and bome
men must clearly be inferior in prudence to the normal man,
for he is avowedly the man of average prudence, and all
averages are reached by taking th mean between inferiority
and excess. Now, then, those who seek to apply the test
of the "normal ma"--the reasonably prudent man-must
avowedly expect and preach what is for some men an impos-
sibility, and it is of no use to assert that such men ought
to have trained themselves beforehand to be "the reasonable
6. 3 Bing. N. C. 468.
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man," unless one can show that all men, even with training
can reach that standard, and also what that standard is.
It is not improbable that some lawyers will admit that
there is much truth in what has been said, but will never-
theless maintain that it is advisable to employ it even though
some individuals may suffer injustice thereby. It is in antici-
pation of this that I have taken up so much space in an
attempt to show that the general rule in question is a delu-
sion, and is not as a matter of fact applied at all, though vain
and fanciful attempts are made to use it. And if the ques-
tion be asked, "Why, if it is not in fact used, is it so strongly
objected to?"-my reply would be, that not only do the
attempts to use it in themselves do harm-and I trust no one
seriously controverts this-but also that this sham standard
by its very acceptance stands in the way of the adoption of
a better one.
A universal standard by abstraction can not result in
anything but mere form. Instead of grasping this point, our
judges and lawyers have compromised between the form and
the matter, and tried to unite two inconsistent elements in a
universal rule; they have made their man typical or general,
but the circumstances under which he is to act, in particular.
For the standard which they recommend is not how the
"normal man" would act under normal or general circum-
stances, but under the given circumstances, i. e., the circum-
stances of the individual whose case they are deciding.
Louis M. BOHNENKAMP, '25.
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